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Abstract 
In the past decade active labour market policy (ALMP) has become a major topic in 
comparative social policy analysis, with scholars exploiting cross-national variation to 
seek to identify the determinants of policy development in this central area of the 
‘new welfare state’. In this paper we argue that better integration of this policy field 
into social policy scholarship however requires rather more critical engagement with 
some considerable methodological, conceptual and theoretical challenges in analysing 
these policies comparatively. Most fundamentally, rather more reflection is needed on 
what the substantially relevant dimensions of variation in ALMP from a social policy 
perspective actually are, as well as enhanced efforts to ensure that it is those that are 
being analysed and compared. 
 
Keywords: comparative social policy; cross-national comparison; active labour 
market policy; activation 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Within mainstream social policy scholarship and debate employment and labour 
market policy has long been a neglected area. With the growing emphasis in recent 
decades on combating unemployment and raising employment rates, and with the 
prevalence of the notions such as ‘activation’ and the ‘active welfare state’ in national 
and international policy discourses, Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP) has 
however become an increasingly frequent object of social policy enquiry. Much of the 
most recent work on ALMP has used available quantitative data to compare policy 
trends cross-nationally with the aim of identifying the socio-economic and political 
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determinants variation in ALMP, placing research on ALMP at the forefront of 
theoretical exploration of the so-called ‘new welfare state’ (Bonoli and Natali 2012).  
 
While the extension of social policy research to this policy field is to be welcomed, 
we believe that it has to date largely occurred without sufficient attention being paid 
to the problems and challenges of analysing ALMP cross-nationally. The aim of this 
paper is to elaborate on these challenges in some detail. Though we do not claim that 
all of the issues we discuss below have gone wholly unacknowledged in the research 
literature, we think that it is important to take stock of the range of challenges to 
meaningful comparison in this area. We argue that cumulatively they highlight 
fundamental problems with the integration to date of ALMP in comparative social 
policy research, and suggest the need for more conceptually and theoretically 
informed qualitative groundwork as a prerequisite for advancing quantitative analyses 
in the field. Comparative research on ALMP, we argue, needs more of the intense 
dialogue between policy specialists and those interested in the determinants of policy 
variation that has enabled intellectual progress in mainstream welfare state research. 
 
We begin with a very brief review of ALMP and how it has featured in social 
scientific research generally and recent social policy scholarship in particular (section 
1). The subsequent sections discuss problems of data reliability (section 2) and issues 
of validity (section 3). Both show that available data on which almost all cross-
national analyses conventionally build have serious limitations for capturing empirical 
developments that researchers want to measure and explain. We then turn to more 
conceptual and theoretical issues (section 4). We argue that much theoretically guided 
research has been guilty both of conceptual under-specification of the ‘dependent 
variable’ of ALMP comparisons and of departing somewhat uncritically from the 
assumption that explanations for the development and variation of ALMP should be 
sought amongst the standard economic, social and political variables mobilized in 
existing analyses of social rights and social spending. In the concluding part of the 
paper (section 5) we draw out the implications of our discussion for future 
comparative work in this important field of social policy activity. 
 
1.  The Growing Interest in ALMP in Comparative Social Policy 
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The term ALMP covers a range of public programmes aimed at increasing 
employment, enabling people to move into jobs and achieving a better match between 
labour supply and demand. The OECD labour market policy database (see Martin, 
2014: 5-6) records as ALMP expenditure on measures targeted on specific groups of 
individuals at risk in the labour market that fall into one of six broad intervention 
categories: public employment services (PES) and administration, training, 
employment incentives, supported and sheltered employment, direct job creation and 
start-up incentives. These are contrasted with expenditure on ‘passive’ labour market 
policies of out-of-work income maintenance and support. ALMPs thus defined are 
themselves far from new, and in some countries – most famously Sweden – have long 
been a core part of the ‘social model’. However, ALMP was until recently rarely an 
object of mainstream social policy scholarship. The few cross-national comparative 
studies of ALMP, whether quantitative (Janoski, 1990; Boix, 1998) or qualitative 
(Weir and Skocpol, 1985; Therborn, 1986; Schmid et al. 1992), were generally 
framed by broader interests in macro-economic policy and combating unemployment, 
and stood at one remove from debates in social policy.  
 
This changed with the ‘activation turn’ of the 1990s (Nelson, 2013), which saw 
governments in developed countries increasingly exhorted to complement their so-
called ‘passive’ labour market policies like unemployment benefits and social 
assistance with supposedly more ‘active’ programmes.  This more explicit association 
of ALMP instruments with the reform agenda around core pillars of the welfare state 
as conventionally conceived sparked a growing interest in ALMP among social policy 
scholars and led to a proliferation of comparative studies. Some of this work has been 
normative, pointing to links between enhanced benefit conditionality and ALMP as 
indicators of general developments towards ‘workfare’ (e.g. Lødemel and Trickey, 
2001; Lødemel and Moreira, 2014). Other studies aimed to identify particular national 
styles of activation (e.g. Barbier, 2001), or sought to understand variation in the 
timing and pace of reforms across countries (e.g. Clasen and Clegg, 2006; Daguerre, 
2007; Weishaupt, 2011). A common concern of this social policy oriented research 
into ALMP and activation has been the mapping of policy differences, as well as in 
the ways in which policy features have been modified over time. Although some 
studies developed explanatory accounts, the objective of arriving at a better 
understanding of ALMP variation appeared to be as, if not more, relevant to this 
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mainly qualitative scholarship than the testing of alternative explanations for cross-
national difference .  
 
From around 2005 a new wave of comparative research has however emerged which 
is primarily based on quantitative data analyses and centrally concerned with 
identifying the determinants of cross-national variations in ALMP, invariably 
expressed in expenditure terms. In this literature public spending on ALMP is thus the 
sole object of empirical analysis, though it is seen as a proxy for a rather diverse range 
of underlying phenomena, including a renewed emphasis on ‘employment 
promotion’, a trend towards ‘workfare’ or an expression of ‘activation’. The analysis 
of change in ALMP across time and space serves as evidence to support competing 
theoretical arguments related to the changing role of partisanship in general and of 
social democracy specifically (for example Rueda 2005, 2006; Huo et al. 2008; Vis, 
2011), the effects of trade union strength (Tepe and Vanhuysse, 2013), the role of the 
European Union in domestic policy (Armingeon 2007; van Vliet and Koster, 2011), 
and the implications for cross-national policy variation of domestic and international, 
or institutional and economic, factors (for example Gaston and Rajaguru, 2008; 
Swank, 2011). 
 
Invariably this body of research has made use of OECD expenditure data , with 
analyses typically starting in 1985 and restricted to 15 or 16 countries for reasons of 
data availability. It might be expected that the use of the same data source, similarities 
in country selection and a common period of investigation should have generated 
some robust and increasingly consensual findings. Instead, the conformity in research 
interest and data application has to date created more rather than less ambiguity about, 
for example, the role of partisanship. In part this lack of intellectual progress may 
reflect differences in the specification of independent and control variables, or the 
failure to disaggregate ALMP spending and focus on different types of programmes 
(Vlandas, 2013; Bonoli, 2013). However, as we suggest below, arguably a more 
relevant reason for the failure to arrive at a more common understanding of variation 
across countries and over time lies in the rather scant attention paid to the particular 
nature and theoretical substance of ALMP in most of this recent research. Before 
addressing these issues, however, we will first draw attention to some more strictly 
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methodological challenges that arise in the use of expenditure data for comparative 
research on ALMP. 
 
2. Reliability Issues 
All of the quantitative analyses mentioned above rely on the OECD, which offers 
publicly available data sets containing information on aggregate ALMP expenditure 
across countries and over time. As discussed further below (see section 4), the 
acknowledgement that ALMP is a rather broad category has also seen some more 
recent quantitative studies (for example Bonoli 2010, 2011; Nelson, 2013; Vlandas, 
2013) exploit the disaggregation of this expenditure data by programme type, 
allowing separate analyses of spending on training, job placement, job creation, and 
so on. However, the reliance on OECD data - whether aggregated or disaggregated – 
means that these studies are capturing much but not all expenditure on ALMP cross-
nationally. The main reason for this is the tradition of responsibility for ALMP being 
substantially decentralised in many developed countries, allied to the fact that the 
requirement in principle for national statistical agencies to report on both national and 
sub-national provision is in fact not followed through in practice, and many sub-
national expenditures therefore go under-reported in comparative data. An additional 
factor that is gaining in importance relates to the implications of the marketization of 
ALMP delivery systems for the availability of sufficiently detailed information on the 
types of services that are being provided in some countries. Each issue can be briefly 
illustrated in turn. 
 
Local and regional authorities often play a major role in the funding and delivery of 
ALMP programmes. Particularly in countries where the provision of social assistance 
benefits and services is the responsibility of municipalities, significant parts of ALMP 
provision is the result of autonomous decisions by local government and highly 
independent from central government directives. Sweden offers one good example, as 
does Germany before the labour market and social security reforms of 2005. While in 
these cases social assistance claimants are (or were) in principle entitled to access 
some ALMP provision from the offices of the national public employment service 
(PES), in practice co-ordination and co-operation deficits between different 
government levels resulted in these claimants facing serious barriers to accessing 
support. In this context, the municipalities stepped in to fund, design and provide their 
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own employment services reserved for recipients of municipally funded benefits (see 
Angelin et al., 2013; Kaps, 2012). 
 
Even in countries where benefit provision is wholly centralized, sub-national 
governments sometimes chose to complement existing provision from the central PES 
with their own provision, due to the perceived inadequacy of national policies in the 
context of dynamics of political competition across different levels of governance. 
The current situation in the UK is illustrative of this. In Scotland in 2012, expenditure 
on so-called employability provision delivered by local authorities (around £70 
million), financed mainly by the Scottish government and the European Social Fund, 
considerably surpassed the expenditure in Scotland from the UK government’s 
flagship ALMP measure, the Work Programme (around £55 million) (Goerne and 
Clegg, 2013). However, the most recently available qualitative report on UK ALMP 
statistics makes clear that no Scottish sub-national provision is recorded in the overall 
UK data provided to Eurostat and the OECD (Eurostat, 2011). 
 
The frequent omission of local ALMP spending from comparative datasets inevitably 
leads to a serious distortion of any kind of comparative analysis based on these 
sources. This is obvious for cross-sectional comparisons across countries with highly 
variable roles for local authorities in providing ALMP. However, the problem is 
equally relevant when making comparisons over time, as apparent trends in 
expenditure may simply be artefacts of shifts in central/local governance 
responsibility for ALMP. For example, far reaching social security reforms in 
Germany in 2005 shifted the responsibility for providing employment services for 
social assistance claimants from the municipalities to institutions with involvement of 
central level PES (Clasen and Goerne, 2011). As a result, services to social assistance 
claimants are today recorded in the national (and, by extension, comparative) ALMP 
data, which was not the case before 2005. As such, the mid-decade decline in ALMP 
expenditure which the OECD recorded for Germany probably considerably 
understates the actual fall in expenditure in this policy area at this time.   
 
The traditional limitations of the OECD data are furthermore being exacerbated by the 
growing delivery role of private agencies in the context of the development of ‘quasi 
markets’ for publicly funded employment programmes (Sol and Westerveld, 2005; 
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van Berkel et al. 2011). Though this trend has gone further in some places than others, 
most developed capitalist countries have at least experimented in recent years with the 
contracting-out of ALMP delivery to private providers, ostensibly to try and 
encourage service innovation and leverage effectiveness and efficiency gains. 
Thoroughgoing privatization however further compromises the quality of national 
administrative, and by extension comparative, data on this policy field. An extreme 
illustration is the case of so-called ‘black box’ contracting, the use of which is most 
clearly seen in the current UK Work Programme (Finn, 2012). Black box contracts 
are essentially non-prescriptive as regards to the specific types of service provision, 
with providers paid largely for achieving certain outcomes rather than for delivering a 
specific set of services. In other words, the principal (normally the PES) explicitly 
refrains from specifying the service content to be delivered by the agent (a private 
company), and the latter cannot be obliged to reveal this information ex post, not least 
for reasons of commercial confidentiality. The move towards performance based 
rewards and away from remuneration based on service fees therefore makes 
accounting for the specific content of ALMP interventions much more difficult. Just 
as comparative analyses of ALMP are beginning to focus on expenditure patterns 
disaggregated by type of instrument or intervention, in many countries this 
information is as a result becoming much more problematic for national statistical 
services to obtain or record in any reliable way. 
 
The general point illustrated by the foregoing discussion is that while the highly 
codified and centrally regulated nature of traditional welfare state programmes, such 
as pensions, sick pay or unemployment benefits, ensures that national expenditure 
data on them is fairly encompassing and offers a relatively high degree of reliability 
across developed countries, the same cannot be said with any degree of certainty for 
the comparative datasets based on national administrative sources that are used in 
most comparative analyses of ALMP.   
 
3. Validity Issues 
Even if comparative datasets recorded ALMP expenditures in different countries in a 
comprehensive and consistent way and at a sufficient level of programmatic detail, 
there would arguably remain considerable limits to their ability to measure what 
researchers believe them to be measuring, namely the intensity of work-focused 
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support for the unemployed across countries and over time, whether this is called 
‘employment promotion’, ‘activation’ or something else. Differently put, alongside 
issues with the reliability of comparative data on ALMP there are also serious 
problems with their validity. This can be illustrated here with respect to two rather 
different issues, namely the particularly acute inferential problems related to attempts 
to control for varying levels of demand for ALMP cross-nationally, on the one hand, 
and the questionable extent to which ALMP data genuinely measures work-focused 
support for the unemployed, on the other. 
 
As almost all studies of ALMP acknowledge, expenditure dynamics are not only the 
result of policy settings, but also depend on factors such as economic development in 
general and unemployment trends in particular. Comparative analyses have therefore 
sought to take account of both, whether through their inclusion as control variables or 
by calculating the ratio of ALMP expenditure (relative to GDP) per percentage point 
of unemployment. Accordingly, several studies use the ratio of spending on both as an 
(additional) indicator of ‘ALMP effort’ and change (for example Huo et al., 2008; 
Bonoli 2010, 2013), and some (Vis, 2007) as a key indicator for the assessment of 
change within and across welfare state types.
i
  
 
Of course, controlling for varying levels of demand or ‘problem pressure’ in this way 
is an established practice in comparative analyses of expenditure on traditional social 
policy programmes, which seek to strip out the effect of differing shares of elderly 
people in the population on retirement expenditures or of varying rates of 
unemployment on unemployment benefit spending. Unemployment rates, which as 
mentioned are used to capture demand in most analyses of ALMP expenditure, are 
however notoriously problematic in comparative analysis as they are expressed as a 
ratio of the labour force (all the people subject to the risk of unemployment). Rates of 
labour force participation vary considerably cross-nationally, particularly at the 
extremes of the age distribution and amongst women. They are also affected by the 
very different ways that labour markets and social policy programmes in developed 
countries are structured, particularly with respect to the extent of part-time 
employment and the administrative categorization of non-employment (Erlinghagen 
and Knuth, 2010; Sengenberger, 2011). Sharp declines in unemployment resulting for 
example from the expansion of early retirement or growing part-time work can thus 
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generate a largely artificial image of increasing ALMP ‘effort’ (as well as of the 
effectiveness of ALMPs), which is arguably precisely what was seen in Denmark and 
the Netherlands in the 1990s (van Oorschot and Abrahamson, 2003).  
 
While the above problem of controlling for demand in a valid way is common to 
analyses of both ALMP expenditure and unemployment benefit expenditure, the 
analyses of ALMP faces an additional inferential difficulty that analyses of 
unemployment benefits or other cash transfer schemes do not. While the latter 
typically do not change their beneficiaries’ situation and administrative status, in 
many countries ALMP measures very deliberately do precisely that, as participants 
are no longer counted as unemployed (for a discussion, see Sengenberger, 2012: 84-
85). Increased expenditure on certain categories of ALMP – such as training or direct 
job creation measures – will under these circumstances tend to itself reduce open 
unemployment as beneficiaries move to alternative labour market statuses 
(respectively inactive or employed in these two examples), albeit without necessarily 
finding regular employment. With reference to the Danish case once more, it is well 
known that the expansion of participation in ALMP was one of the major drivers 
behind declines in (open) unemployment in the 1990s (Bredgaard and Jørgensen, 
2000). For cross-national comparisons of ALMP, this kind of mechanism creates the 
obvious potential that indicators of ‘effort’ will be endogenously ratcheted upwards or 
downwards by increases or decreases in expenditure on measures that directly have an 
impact on the unemployment rate, itself typically used as the denominator in 
calculating ‘effort’. 
 
This is just one reason why it is arguably quite questionable how much evidence of 
higher or lower ALMP ‘effort’ across countries or over time actually tells us about the 
extent of underlying intensity of work-focused support for the unemployed. Another 
is that it is unclear that ALMP data is always mainly recording work-focused support 
for the unemployed. Oldervoll (2014) has pointed out that the OECD data include 
information on numerous national programmes that are not actually designed to 
facilitate entry into the open labour market, but that serve as implicit or explicit 
alternatives to work for people who are not expected to be looking for employment. 
This can be shown, for example, by their very low participant inflow and outflow 
rates, and average individual participation periods of sometimes considerably more 
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than 10 years in some schemes in Sweden and Norway. Considerable shares of 
national ALMP spending in other countries may also focus on ‘sheltered 
employment’, as in the Netherlands, or be devoted to permanent wage subsidies for 
people with reduced work capacity, as in Denmark (ibid.). Of course, these types of 
programmes provide income to participants and other valuable benefits derived from 
being in a work activity. However, their inclusion into the ALMP portfolio suggests 
that (total) spending as reported by national governments, and thus included in 
international databases, should not necessarily be seen as a response to the problem of 
unemployment or as wholly (or even mainly) directed at the unemployed.
ii
  
 
While ALMP might - as in this example - sometimes be regarded as an indicator that 
is too broad, from a different vantage point it might equally be considered as being 
too narrow. As ‘activation’ principles have gained ground governments in many 
countries have converted measures traditionally targeted narrowly at the unemployed, 
and which are thus counted in ALMP statistics, into general measures that benefit all 
those active in the labour market, which are not. For example, while between 1995 
and 2005 expenditure in France on fiscal employment incentives targeted on the 
unemployed, as counted in OECD data, fell from 0.22 per cent of GDP to 0.12 per 
cent, over the same period expenditure on so-called allègements généraux - 
employment incentives targeted not on the basis of employment status but on the 
basis of salary level – were expanded massively, expenditure increasing from 0.3 per 
cent of GDP in 1995 to 1 per cent in 2005. Similarly, the contemporary portrayal of 
the UK as a low-spender on ALMP compared with other OECD countries (see, for 
example, Berry, 2014) is in large part due to the exclusion of expenditure on 
generalised wage subsidies in the form of tax credits, which in the early 2000s 
absorbed more than five times the expenditure devoted to the government’s flagship 
ALMP measure, the New Deal (Clasen, 2005: 83). The omission of such non-targeted 
but arguably functionally equivalent measures can lead to fairly major inferential 
measures in studies operationalising ‘activation’ or ‘employment promotion’ through 
ALMP expenditure data alone.  
 
4. Conceptual and Theoretical Issues 
This problem of ALMP expenditure being potentially either too narrow or too broad 
as an indicator of social policy change suggests that comparative research is 
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challenged not only by issues of data reliability and validity, but equally needs to pay 
closer attention to the theoretical substance of spending data, and the underlying 
concept of ALMP ‘effort’, for the understanding the determinants and dynamics of 
state intervention. In other words, more consideration needs to be given to the 
conceptual specification of the ‘dependent variable’ in comparative ALMP research. 
 
The concept of ALMP ‘effort’ recalls that of welfare ‘effort’ which featured heavily 
in the first generation of larger-N analyses of traditional welfare state programmes 
(Wilensky, 1975; Cameron, 1978; Stephens, 1979; Schmidt, 1983). Esping-Andersen 
(1989: 19) famously criticized this generation of scholarship for its reliance on social 
expenditure data, which he noted was ‘epiphenomenal to the theoretical substance of 
welfare states’. This  critique has often been misunderstood as a concern about the use 
of expenditure data per se (for example, Jensen, 2011), when it was rather the 
underlying conceptualization – or perhaps better the absence of conceptualization - of 
welfare state activity in this literature that was Esping-Andersen’s true target. His 
argument was that prior to embarking on empirical analysis of welfare state 
determinants it is first necessary to identify criteria or concepts that could ‘capture the 
ideals or designs that historical actors sought to realize in the struggles over the 
welfare state’ (Esping-Andersen, 1989: 20). Building on the insights of Polanyi and 
others, Esping-Andersen advocated concepts such as ‘decommodifcation’ and 
‘stratification’ as expressions of the outcomes of such struggles, and set about 
operationalising these for comparative empirical enquiry. 
 
The important point here is that strong parallels can be drawn between the conceptual 
limitations of the early comparative welfare state scholarship and that of recent cross-
national quantitative research on ALMP. Though the use of the concept of ALMP 
‘effort’ has at times been justified by the argument that this is supposedly a ‘one size 
fits all’ policy area that appeals to conservatives, liberals and social democrats alike 
(Armingeon, 2007: 906), or that all different ALMP programmes have some common 
characteristics from the point of view of unemployed people (Huo, 2009: 103), at a 
certain level of abstraction similar arguments could of course be advanced about 
traditional welfare state programmes, or indeed any public policy. But just as 
aggregate welfare state expenditure data masks policies of widely differing political 
inspiration and distributive effect, so ALMP ‘effort’ can be made up of expenditures 
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on programmes that have markedly different effects on unemployed individuals and 
on the labour market, and presumably align in very different ways with the interests 
of employers and unions or the ideologies of conservatives, liberals and social 
democrats. While this has long been recognized in more qualitative comparative 
approaches to ‘activation’ or ‘workfare’ (e.g. Lødemel and Trickey, 2001; Barbier, 
2001), in quantitative comparative research this aspect is often ignored. In view of 
this it is hardly surprising that the controversies over the determinants of ALMP effort 
have proved rather difficult to resolve. 
 
Recently, however, some comparative quantitative research on ALMP has engaged 
with and sought to address this problem. For example, Vlandas (2013: 4) has analysed 
the determinants of selected sub-types of ALMP, based on the programmatic 
categorization in the OECD database. He argues that the determinants of ‘direct job 
creation’ measures can be assumed to differ from the determinants of ‘private sector 
employment incentives’, as the former are unambiguously in the interests of both the 
unemployed and employees, while the latter can be expected to place downward 
pressure on wages, and are thus unlikely to be popular with (employed) core social 
democratic voters.  
 
While this and similar approaches (e.g. Tepe and Vanhuysse, 2013) represent a 
substantial advance in sophistication on studies using aggregate expenditure as a 
proxy for ALMP ‘effort’, there are however a number of problems which arise from 
basing an analysis of discrete types of labour market policy intervention on categories 
established for administrative, rather than scientific or theoretical, purposes. For 
example, the OECD category of ‘direct job creation’ includes but does not 
differentiate between public employment schemes introduced in periods of high 
unemployment to the benefit of ‘core workers’, and ‘make work’ measures that target 
very long-term unemployed benefit claimants who are unlikely to find regular 
employment even when unemployment is low. Taking the example of German job 
creation schemes, the relatively well paid Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen, introduced 
to cushion mass unemployment in East Germany after reunification, are clearly 
qualitatively different from the more recent Arbeitsgelegenheiten, which offer low 
remuneration and are mainly designed to ‘socially integrate’ claimants considered 
very distant from the labour market. Though both classified as ‘direct job creation’ in 
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comparative data, these programmes have very distinctive aims and presumably very 
different political support coalitions. Somewhat similarly, the extent to which ‘job 
subsidy’ schemes are likely to exert downward pressure on wages is crucially 
determined by their design features, including their target groups and reach up the 
wage distribution. The statistical accounting of these measures is blind to such 
distinctions – all job subsidy schemes are similarly classified by Eurostat and OECD 
as ‘employment incentives’ - which have however been crucial to their acceptance by 
unions and social democratic parties in practice across Europe. In short, while 
disaggregating the concept of ALMP into policies which can be assumed to be 
determined differently seems sensible, relevant concepts as well as derived categories 
need to reflect theoretical considerations rather than administrative conventions, 
which is a point which we will revisit below (section 5). 
 
The theoretical limitations of recent social policy scholarship on ALMP are not only 
confined to challenges of conceptualisation of the dependent variable, but also extend 
to the range of independent or explanatory variables. As mentioned above (section 1), 
aside from a few studies on the role of the European Union and other international 
organizations, the explanations for cross-nationally variable patterns of ALMP 
development have been sought among the ‘usual suspects’, i.e. political variables 
(partisanship; political institutions) and economic factors (economic openness; 
corporatism) which have already featured heavily in comparative research on classic 
welfare state programmes. The underlying but unarticulated assumption here is that 
ALMPs are essentially comparable to cash transfer programmes as dependent 
variables for comparative analysis (for a discussion, see Clasen and Clegg, 2007), and 
their development should therefore be explained in a broadly similar way. 
 
However, in at least three important respects ALMPs are actually quite unlike cash 
transfers. First, while cash transfers are – almost by definition – entitlement 
programmes, most ALMPs are a form of discretionary spending, and the politics of 
discretionary spending and entitlement programmes are known to differ in significant 
ways (e.g. see Breunig and Busemeyer, 2012). Governments do not normally need to 
embark of the arduous process of changing legislation to modify their ALMP ‘effort’, 
but can instead make ongoing adjustments through regular budgetary procedures. An 
implication of this is that the possibility frontier for ALMP expenditure will be shaped 
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by cross-national variations in systems of public expenditure planning and control that 
are of limited explanatory relevance with respect to social rights. As a major 
pioneering qualitative comparative analysis of the determinants of ALMP underlined, 
a significant role in explaining cross-national variation in this policy field is played by 
different financing systems (Schmid et al. 1992), an institutional variable which is not 
usually foregrounded in comparative analyses of social transfer programmes. 
 
Second, ALMP is a policy that does not have the same unambiguous impact as 
classical welfare state programmes. When proposing modifications to the legal rules 
governing entitlement programmes, social and political actors can be relatively certain 
of the impact that the changes they advocate will have on the incomes of all 
concerned populations.
iii
 At both the individual and aggregate levels, the effect of 
increased expenditure on one or other type of ALMP is by contrast far more difficult 
to predict, as the ample evaluation literature on this subject has shown (for a review, 
see Card et al, 2010). While participating in a training programme may positively 
improve the employment prospects of an unemployed individual, equally it could 
have no effect at all or even a negative one. A targeted job subsidy programme may 
lead to additional job creation, or might equally crowd out unsubsidized work through 
deadweight losses and substitution effects. At a minimum such uncertainty around the 
individual and aggregate effects of ALMPs makes it very difficult to unambiguously 
ascribe clear and stable preferences for and against them to social and political actors, 
as standard quantitative approaches require.
iv
 More fundamentally, insofar as the 
evaluation evidence is in general relatively sober as regards the effectiveness of 
ALMP it may even be necessary to consider whether the traditional mechanism of 
actors seeking credit by advocating policies that will benefit particular constituencies 
really has much traction (Bonoli, 2012). As far back as the mid-1980s, when the 
Conservative government in the UK was spending massively on ALMP – particularly 
through direct job creation schemes such as the ‘Community Programme’ – while 
simultaneously pursuing policies that were otherwise driving up unemployment and 
doing battle with the unions, Richardson and Henning (1984) suggested that these 
policies were essentially ‘symbolic’ or ‘placebo’ measures. In other words, they were 
intended to signal concern about unemployment and massage open unemployment 
downwards for electoral reasons rather than to really offer anything of value to the 
unemployed themselves. 
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Finally, allied to its discretionary character, the multi-level and multi-actor nature of 
this policy field adds complexity not only to its measurement, but also to its politics. 
In this policy environment political authorities in many countries have invested in 
ALMP for reasons that have very little (directly) to do with the broad economic or 
political factors whose influence is explored in recent literature. For example, through 
so-called ‘shifting yard’ policies German local authorities for many years spent 
money on job creation schemes essentially to re-entitle long-term unemployed people 
to insurance benefits, thereby transferring the burden of supporting the jobless from 
(locally financed) social assistance to the social insurance system (Clasen 2005: 67). 
Somewhat differently, the fact that many ALMP measures are provided through 
nongovernmental third parties has always meant that provider interests have been an 
important part of the political story of expenditure dynamics in this field (Moon and 
Richardson 1984), and one that is likely to become more important with the recent 
entrance of large multinational corporations into expanding welfare-to-work markets. 
In these respects the politics of social services provision may offer an as, or even 
more, useful analogy for explanatory accounts of ALMP than the core entitlement 
programmes of the ‘old welfare state’. 
 
5. Conclusions: Advancing Comparative Social Policy Analysis of ALMP 
The growing integration of work on ALMP into the mainstream of comparative social 
policy research in recent years is a welcome development. Many developed countries 
allocate substantial amounts of public expenditure to ALMP programmes and these 
are increasingly central to contemporary debates on social provision for working-age 
people. The new interest in ALMP has extended the reach of social policy analysis, 
which traditionally tended to concentrate on other policy fields, and notably on cash 
transfers. In this context it is certainly crucial for social policy scholars to devote 
attention to mapping and explaining diverse policy patterns across countries and over 
time. However, as we have discussed, there are a number of methodological, 
conceptual and theoretical challenges that recent scholarship on ALMP has neglected 
or insufficiently addressed. In this concluding section we turn towards suggestions for 
addressing some of these. 
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Theoretically, firstly, it should not be assumed that comparative understanding of the 
‘new welfare state’, of which ALMP is a central pillar, can rely solely on the 
explanatory toolkit through which we made sense of the old one. ALMP is clearly a 
different kind of social policy instrument (or set of instruments) from standardized 
social rights, one of a clutch of ‘new social programmes’ that typically implicate more 
levels of government and have more complex, multi-actor delivery systems than 
conventional cash transfers (Ferrera, 2005: 173). For this reason, as we have 
discussed, it is likely that consideration of rather different (or additional) political and 
institutional variables will be needed for adequate explanation of trends in the 
development of ALMP across countries and over time. The process of uncovering the 
causal dynamics specific to this policy field is still in its infancy, and in our view 
there remains a major role for further qualitative comparisons of a few carefully 
selected national cases, which would enable more explicit and systematic reflection 
on the multiple determinants of policy change in this area as a first step to generating 
more domain-sensitive hypotheses for comparative quantitative analysis. 
 
While future comparative analysis of ALMP should reason less by theoretical analogy 
with mainstream comparative welfare state research, it could however usefully draw 
more inspiration from the development of this literature as regards conceptual and 
methodological advancement. Comparative welfare state research took a substantial 
stride forward when scholars on the one hand moved beyond thin conceptualizations 
of cross-national variation – such as welfare ‘effort’ - that were merely based on the 
most readily available indicators (social expenditure), and on the other invested the 
substantial time and resources necessary to collect the full range of institutional and 
expenditure data required to operationalize the theoretically relevant dimensions of 
social programmes more adequately across a large number of countries. In a similar 
way there is today a fundamental need in this field to reconsider and re-specify what 
the theoretically relevant dimensions of variation in ALMP are, and then to ensure as 
far as possible that is those we are measuring empirically.  
 
There are signs in the recent literature that comparative quantitative scholarship on 
ALMP is belatedly rising to the challenge of better conceptualisation of this policy 
area. Both Bonoli (2010; 2013) and Nelson (2013) have recently proposed approaches 
that are based on a priori theoretical reflection about the most politically and 
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economically salient features of ALMP, rather than being derived from readily 
available indicators. Bonoli (2013: 23-24) for example identifies two principal 
dimensions of variation in ALMP designs (their pro-market orientation, on the one 
hand, and the extent to which they invest in human capital, on the other), allowing 
him to derive four main theoretical types of ALMP (‘incentive reinforcement’, 
‘employment assistance’, ‘occupation’ and ‘upskilling’). However, these conceptual 
advances have not to date been matched by the identification, collection and analysis 
of theoretically relevant data. Acknowledging the limits of available datasets, Bonoli 
(ibid: 29) is forced to rely empirically on the standard OECD expenditure data 
categories, in which there is in fact not a single empirical referent for one of his four 
conceptual types (‘incentive reinforcement’) and where the data is at best an imperfect 
proxy for the three others. This clearly illustrates the urgent need for the identification 
and collection of comparative time-series data that tap theoretically derived 
dimensions for cross-national analysis of ALMP, and indeed of policies addressing 
‘new social risks’ more broadly (Danforth and Stephens, 2013). 
 
Such an initiative would of course represent a major undertaking, requiring a 
considerable and sustained investment of resources in developing research 
infrastructure that would be unlikely to bear fruit for a number of years. Even without 
this, however, there is arguably much that could be done to enhance the quality of 
cross-national ALMP comparisons through more systematic and comprehensive 
exploitation of data that is already publicly available. For example, alongside 
expenditure data the OECD and Eurostat have long published information about 
numbers of ALMP programme participants, and these could be used in conjunction 
with expenditure data to develop better – if still imperfect – proxies for ALMP ‘policy 
logics’, which can be argued to turn not only on how much money is spent on a 
measure but also on how many people benefit from it (see also De Deken and Clasen, 
2013). Moreover, as Oldervoll (2014) has pointed out, comparative analysts could 
make better use of the more disaggregated ALMP data published annually by Eurostat 
(e.g. Eurostat, 2012) and particularly the associated ‘qualitative reports’ (e.g. Eurostat, 
2014). The latter provide detailed information about a range of ALMP schemes at 
country level, including programme specific target groups, eligibility criteria, sources 
of funding and annual stocks, as well as inflows and outflows of participants (e.g. 
Eurostat, 2013). Close scrutiny of these sources could aid in the construction of more 
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reliable and valid comparative indicators, helping for example in identifying where 
sub-national expenditures are not accurately recorded and in better allocating 
expenditure on particular programmes to theoretically-derived categories. 
 
The common theme linking all these recommendations is of the need for quantitative 
cross-national analysis of ALMP to be based on better qualitative and policy 
groundwork. Though quantitative comparisons have the potential to be a powerful 
tool for testing general theoretical arguments in social policy, they have to compare 
aspects of policy that are interesting, significant and reliably measured, which 
requires detailed knowledge of the structure and operation of these policies in 
different national contexts. Comparative social policy analysis has an enviable 
tradition of a close and fruitful dialogue between policy specialists and those with 
broader interests in the determinants of policy variation. In our view, intensification of 
such a dialogue is a prerequisite to further the integration of research on ALMP into 
the field of comparative social policy analysis going forward. 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
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i
 While some studies control for differing levels of unemployment by dividing ALMP expenditure 
directly by the unemployment rate to construct a ratio of expenditure per percentage point of 
unemployment, others include unemployment directly as a control variable in regression. As Bonoli 
(2006) discusses, the choice between these strategies is not without consequence for the robustness of 
the resulting statistical analyses. 
ii
 This also questions efforts of accounting for the unemployment rate in assessing ALMP 
comparatively. 
iii
 The problem of non-take-up that characterizes means tested entitlement programmes of course 
suggests a partial qualification to this certainty.  
iv
 Evidence of this can be seen in the assumptions about partisan politics and recruitment subsidies 
made by respectively Nelson (2012) and Vlandas (2013). While the former hypothesizes that centre left 
parties will favour recruitment subsidies the latter hypothesizes exactly the opposite, ostensibly because 
the author factors in widespread substitution effects. Both hypotheses receive empirical support in the 
respective studies. 
